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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MYRIAD IN VIEW OF THE PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE:
ADOPTING A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

INTRODUCTION
Modern advances in biotechnology have created analytical tension in the
patent system, stretching the boundaries of the notion of patentability.1 The
conditions precedent to an invention’s patentability can generally be
categorized by four terms of the Patent Act of 1952: subject matter eligibility,2
utility,3 novelty,4 and nonobviousness.5 Due to the lack of statutory specificity
relating to the definition of subject matter eligibility, uncertainty has developed
about the patent eligibility of would-be inventions.6 Contributing to this
uncertainty, courts have recently attempted to use 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a
mechanism for limiting the scope of available business method protection.7
The murkiness of this statutory element has resulted in a conflation of its
requirements with the issues of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.8 The

1. See Stephen H. Schilling, Note, DNA as Patentable Subject Matter and a Narrow
Framework for Addressing the Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents, 61 DUKE L.J. 731,
732–33 (2011).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); see also
Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 326
(2010) (“A judicious analysis of patent jurisprudence reveals a two-step method for determining
patent-eligible subject matter: an invention is patent-eligible if (1) it corresponds to a statutory
category outlined in section 101 of the Patent Act, which includes processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter, and (2) does not violate the product of nature doctrine,
which precludes eligibility for laws of nature, natural phenomenon, mental processes, and abstract
ideas.” (footnote omitted)).
3. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58
(2011) (“[T]he requirement that an invention be useful has been nearly nonexistent—essentially
ignored. The level of ‘utility’ an applicant must currently demonstrate to obtain a patent is
extremely low: the invention need only operate as described and potentially provide some de
minimis public benefit.” (footnote omitted)).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
5. See id. § 103.
6. See Parasidis, supra note 1, at 326.
7. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
8. See Patentable Subject Matter and the Supreme Court Myriad Preview, PATENTLY-O
BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:24 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/08/patentable-subjectmatter.html.
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effects of this confusion on modern scientific progress can be seen in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark
Office (Myriad I) and its subsequent procedural history.9
Much has been said about the Myriad litigation, but confusion still exists.
In 2009, a group of plaintiffs represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union filed suit in federal court challenging the validity of patents held by
Myriad Genetics over sequences of isolated DNA and cDNA and the methods
of creating those same genetic compositions.10 Myriad I was decided once at
trial, affirmed in part and reversed in part on appeal by the Federal Circuit,
vacated on certiorari, and again affirmed in part and reversed in part by the
Federal Circuit for the same reasons as the initial Federal Circuit opinion.11 In
both Federal Circuit decisions, each judge on the three-member panel diverged
as to the reason for his or her opinion. Additionally, the district court judge
based his opinion on an entirely different rationale than any of the three
Federal Circuit judges. The difference of opinion among the four judges
underscores the confusion in patentability cases, particularly as applied in the
biotechnology field. Each of the judges purported to base his or her conclusion
on § 101, and each of the judges cited cases that consider the import of
nineteenth-century Supreme Court precedent that articulates a rule for the
patentability of purifications of preexisting products. This Note tracks the
development of the purification doctrine, discusses its application to the
Myriad litigation, and proposes an analytical approach to the doctrine that
would create more predictable and consistent results in patentability cases.
The purified preexisting products doctrine was established by the Supreme
Court in the nineteenth century.12 At that time, the basic articulation of the
doctrine could be conveyed as follows: a mere extraction of a pure
composition from impure surroundings does not support a composition claim,
but the method of extracting the pure composition from its impure
surroundings could support a method claim.13 This simple articulation of the
rule was established as an offshoot of the product of nature doctrine, an
important judicial rule defining a portion of § 101 subject matter eligibility.14
The purified preexisting products doctrine does not, however, exclusively
apply to extractions of products of nature. Instead, it can be applied to any

9. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
10. Id. at 183–86.
11. See infra Part II.C–D.
12. See Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884); Am. Wood-Paper
Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874).
13. See Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 593–94.
14. See Parasidis, supra note 1, at 326.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

MYRIAD IN VIEW OF THE PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE

771

known previously existing product, be it naturally occurring or man-made.15
Over the course of time and likely in response to developments in sciences
such as microbiology and pharmaceuticals, the purified preexisting products
doctrine began to be applied differently by different courts.16 Much of the
confusion about the doctrine arose out of the Court’s simple statement thereof.
The rule statement leaves out crucial metrics for determining what qualifies as
a mere extraction and what amounts to more than that. For purposes of this
Note, this important distinction is framed as the difference between a mere
extraction (unpatentable subject matter) and a new “kind” of composition
(patentable subject matter).
This Note contends that the primary reason for confusion in the application
of the doctrine is the lack of a defining characteristic that distinguishes
products that are different in “kind” from one another. In view of its origins,
the purification doctrine is clearly an offshoot of the product of nature doctrine,
which is a subject matter eligibility issue. This Note presumes the position that
the statutory elements of patentability ought to be considered separately from
one another. Assuming this premise and considering the Supreme Court’s
articulation of the doctrine, the proposed standard for “kinds” of products is a
discrete issue of subject matter eligibility. Accordingly, so as not to conflate
subject matter eligibility with the other statutory elements, the standard ought
to be free from considerations that overlap with statutory utility, novelty, or
nonobviousness analyses. Instead, in keeping with the fundamental tenet of
claim drafting, a composition’s “kind” ought to be an exclusively structural
determination. Ultimately, the relevant structural definition can be determined
by the chemical boundaries of molecules and formula units, so that chemically
distinct compositions comprise new materials in “kind” that are therefore
eligible subject matter.
I. CASELAW DEFINING THE PURIFIED PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE
A.

The Statutory Basis for the Purified Preexisting Products Doctrine

One threshold requirement of patentability is that an inventive conception
be one that falls within statutorily eligible subject matter.17 Patent examiners
are instructed to first identify “what, precisely, the applicant has invented and
is seeking to patent, and how the claims relate to and define that invention.”18

15. Compare Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 577, 596 (applying the doctrine to a pulp made by
boiling naturally occurring wood in an alkali under pressure), with Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 311
(applying the doctrine to man-made, artificial alizarine).
16. See infra Part I.C–F.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
18. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
2106 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP].
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It is the claims that “define the property rights provided by a patent, and thus
require careful scrutiny.”19 Before considering whether an inventive concept is
patent-eligible subject matter, an examiner must conduct a thorough review of
the prior art.20
Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”21 In Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended the
expansive language of this statute to include “anything under the sun that is
made by man.”22 According to the Court, the language of § 101, which has
been carried over from the original Patent Act, authored by Thomas Jefferson
in 1793, embodied the philosophy that “ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.”23 The Federal Circuit has likewise adopted a liberal
interpretation of § 101:
The use of the expansive term “any” in § 101 represents Congress’s intent not
to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be
obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101 and the other parts of Title
35 . . . . Thus, it is improper to read into § 101 limitations as to the subject
matter that may be patented where the legislative history does not indicate that
24
Congress clearly intended such limitations.

The plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 creates four categories of patentable
subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of
matter.25 According to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”),
“[t]he latter three categories define ‘things’ or ‘products’ while the first
category defines ‘actions.’”26 Section 100(b) of Title 35 provides that “[t]he
term ‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”27
Thus, § 101 defines four discrete categories of patent-eligible subject matter.
Even though courts liberally construe § 101 so as to make it a minimal
barrier to patentability, it does exclude certain concepts, namely those that are
not machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or processes.28 “The
subject matter courts have found to be outside of, or exceptions to, the four

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
22. 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980).
23. Id. at 308.
24. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
26. MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
28. MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106.
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statutory categories of invention is limited to abstract ideas, laws of nature and
natural phenomena.”29 “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right.”30 These conceptions are “part of the
storehouse of knowledge” and are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”31
Claims that include otherwise excluded subject matter might still be
patentable if they are a “practical application” of the abstract idea, law of
nature, or natural phenomenon.32 For many years, the test for whether a claim
was a “practical application” was the machine-or-transformation test.33
Recently, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that the machine-ortransformation test is not the exclusive test.34 However, even under Bilski, the
machine-or-transformation test offers insight into patentability,35 and patent
examiners are still instructed to assess whether a claim is directed to (1) a
practical application of excluded subject matter by physical transformation, or
(2) a practical application of excluded subject matter that produces useful,
concrete, and tangible results.36
Accordingly, at the very least, one useful consideration for determining
whether a patent claim that recites excluded subject matter is a “practical
application” is whether it transforms or reduces an article to a different state or
thing. The eligibility analysis varies based on the type of claim involved, i.e.,
whether the claimed invention is a method, composition, etcetera. Because the
common law subject matter exclusions (abstract ideas, laws of nature, products
of nature, and natural phenomena) are distinct categories, this analysis has
varied depending upon which exclusion applies. In particular, a lengthy and
windy jurisprudence has attempted to define products of nature.
B.

Supreme Court Establishment of the Purification Doctrine

In 1874, the Supreme Court in American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre
Disintegrating Co. considered the validity of a patent held by a paper

29. Id.
30. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
31. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
32. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 187 (1981). A “practical application” of an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon also can be referred to as a patentable
process.
33. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“Under the Court of Appeals’
formulation, an invention is a ‘process’ only if: ‘(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus,
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.’”).
34. Id. at 3226.
35. Id. at 3227.
36. See MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106.
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manufacturer on a pure form of cellulose pulp.37 In its patent, the plaintiffs
claimed “a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, made from wood or
other vegetable substances, by boiling the wood or other vegetable substance
in an alkali under pressure.”38 In a separate patent, the plaintiffs also claimed
the process by which such a pulp was created.39 When the patent was issued,
paper manufacturers everywhere used wood- or vegetation-based cellulose
pulps to make paper.40 The plaintiff’s only argument sustaining the validity of
the product patent was that the pulp created “by boiling the wood or other
vegetable substance in an alkali under pressure” was a purer form of cellulose
than had ever before been used or created.41
The Court found that the patent over the pure form of paper pulp cellulose
was invalid because it was a mere extract of a preexisting product.42 Though a
process for obtaining a purified extract of a preexisting material is patentable
subject matter, the extract itself may not be.43 For patents over products and
chemical compounds to be valid, their “kind” must have been “unknown prior
to their alleged invention.”44 Though not used by the Court, the term “kind” is
chosen carefully because it is at this point in patentability analysis that issues
get confused, and it is this precise term that needs definition for clarity to be
restored. In American Wood-Paper, the product’s “kind” was “a pulp suitable
for the manufacture of paper, made from wood or other vegetable
substances.”45 By defining the invention’s “kind” as “a pulp suitable for the
manufacture of paper,” the Court seemed to focus on both the material
properties of the product and the useful purpose of the product. In considering
the utility of the product as relevant to whether it was substantially the same in
“kind” as a preexisting product, the Court, whether intentionally or in haste,
began what would become a long history of conflating structure and utility.
The Court found that, because cellulose pulps were regularly used in the
manufacture of paper at the time of the invention, a mere extraction of a purer
form of such a product was not patentable subject matter.46
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court affirmed and strengthened its
general holding in American Wood-Paper. Eleven years after that decision, in
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, the Court considered the validity

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593–94 (1874).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 580.
See id. at 567.
Id. at 577, 594.
See Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 596.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 594.
Id.
See id. at 596.
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of a patent claiming artificial alizarine produced by any method.47 Alizarine is
a natural product, contained in the root of a certain genus of tree, known to be
useful as a dye.48 The Court found that artificial alizarine was the same product
in “kind” as naturally occurring alizarine because both products have the same
chemical form (C14H8O4).49 The Cochrane holding extended the reach of the
purified preexisting products doctrine beyond its origin in American WoodPaper to man-made products. Furthermore, the Court seemed to show an
analytical shift from defining two products as the same in “kind” based on their
structural and utilitarian similarities to defining two products as the same in
“kind” based on their structural similarities alone.50 Around this time period
and prior to significant development in micro-sciences, the Commissioner of
Patents regularly denied patent applications for purified preexisting products.51
However, the doctrine would only remain wholly intact for a short while
longer.
C. Early Circuit Court Erosion of the Purification Doctrine
Shortly after the turn of the century, the purified preexisting products
doctrine began to erode in the circuit courts, giving way to policy arguments
premised on the promotion of scientific progress. In 1910, the Seventh Circuit
considered Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co.52 There, the
defendant had created an impure form of acetyl salicylic acid before the
plaintiff had developed a manufacturing process for its pure form, Aspirin, for
which the plaintiff obtained a patent.53 The court upheld the plaintiff’s patent
despite the defendant’s argument that the invention was not patentable subject
matter because it was a mere purified form of a preexisting product.54 The
court found that, though the plaintiff’s invention was a mere purification of the
defendant’s product from a structural standpoint, therapeutically, the two
products had dispositive differences.55 In so holding, the court effectively
found that the two forms of acetyl salicylic acid were different in “kind”

47. 111 U.S. 293, 296 (1884).
48. Id. at 297.
49. Id. at 311.
50. This conclusion is based on the analytical process of the Court. Rather than noting that
the two products served the same purpose, the Court solely highlighted the artificial alizarine’s
and the madder root alizarine’s chemical identity. See id. at 311–12.
51. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 333 (2002);
see also Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, 125–27 (holding that a purified pine
needle fiber was not patentable).
52. 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910).
53. Id. at 702–03.
54. See id. at 705.
55. Id.
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because the two products had markedly different utility. The plaintiff’s form of
the product could pass through the stomach unaltered to be deconstructed in
the intestines, where it could provide therapeutic value and minimize adverse
results.56 On the other hand, the defendant’s product could not pass through the
stomach without becoming unbounded, which proved to be injurious to many
patients in a therapeutic setting.57
One year later, Judge Learned Hand, while sitting as judge for the Circuit
Court of the Southern District of New York, issued an opinion adopting the
Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on utility as the dispositive factor in determining a
product’s “kind.”58 In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., the validity of a
patent on a purified form of adrenaline was challenged because it was said to
be no more than a purification of preexisting adrenaline products.59 Judge
Hand upheld the validity of the patent on the new, purified product on the basis
of its increased therapeutic value,60 but he also pointed towards the structural
differences between the purified adrenaline and the preexisting adrenaline.61 In
what appears to be a total shift from the doctrine of American Wood-Paper and
Cochrane, Judge Hand found that the structural distinction between the newer
form of purified adrenaline and the older impure form was sufficient to
validate the newer form’s patent.62
D. Early Strong Application of the Purification Doctrine
In 1928, the Third Circuit in General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co.
considered an infringement claim against a patent on pure tungsten.63 As a
naturally occurring material, tungsten always exists in oxide form (WO3).64 In
this form it is highly brittle and of little value in electrical applications, but, in
its pure form, tungsten becomes highly ductile and particularly valuable when
used as wire in lighting systems.65 Despite the fact that tungsten oxide and pure
tungsten are two different materials and that only tungsten oxide exists in
nature, the court found that exposing the naturally occurring tungsten oxide to
heat treatment to create tungsten in pure form amounted to a mere discovery of

56. Id. at 704.
57. Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 704.
58. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
59. See id. at 97, 103.
60. Id. at 103.
61. Id. at 98.
62. Id.
63. 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928). The relevant claim at issue read as follows: “Substantially
pure tungsten having ductility and high tensile strength.” Id. at 643.
64. Id. at 642.
65. Id.
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pure tungsten.66 Accordingly, the court found that tungsten was a product of
nature and not patentable subject matter.67
Some commentators consider General Electric to follow from the
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane progeny.68 If that is the case, it
represents a high-water mark for an application of the purified preexisting
products doctrine focusing on the structural similarity of two products as
dispositive of their sameness in “kind.” However, since tungsten and tungsten
oxide are actually two distinct materials with two distinct chemical
structures,69 pure tungsten is not really a purification of tungsten oxide.
Instead, General Electric is better read as a strong application of the rule that
products of nature are not patentable subject matter. The court essentially held
that tungsten exists in nature, and, prior to this method of heat treatment, no
one knew how to find it. The processes used in bringing out the pure tungsten
are akin to a vast exploratory expedition into remote, largely inaccessible
recesses of the earth which reveals new (in the sense of previously
undiscovered) materials with rich utility.70
In the mid-to-late 1930s, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(“C.C.P.A.”) issued holdings on a pair of cases that showed its continued
support for the purified preexisting products doctrine. In In re Ridgway, the
court considered an appeal from a patent examiner’s rejection of a patent
application for a pure form of alpha alumina.71 Mirroring the language in
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane, the court found that while the applicants
“might be entitled to a patent on a method of purifying alpha alumina, they
would not be entitled to a patent on the article alpha alumina, a natural product,
merely because of the degree of purity of the article.”72 The court upheld the
patent examiner’s rationale that the rejection was “not necessarily based upon
the fact that the applicants sought to get a patent on pure alpha alumina, but
that they sought to get a patent on a nearly pure alpha alumina.”73 The court
did not include in its analysis any discussion of the utility of the purer form of
alpha alumina and focused on the structural similarity between the preexisting
form and the form claimed in the patent application. However, the court
seemed to suggest that if an altogether pure form of alpha alumina could be
created, the structural differences would be significant enough to make that
form of the product different in “kind” from preexisting forms of the product.
66. See id. at 643.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 51, at 339.
69. After all, no one would argue that O2 (oxygen) is a mere purification of H2O (water).
70. The C.C.P.A. also considered a similar case rejecting product claims over ductile
uranium as unpatentable subject matter. See In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
71. 76 F.2d 602, 602 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
72. Id. at 603.
73. Id.
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A few years later, the same court cemented this analysis as a rigid
exception to the purified preexisting products doctrine in the case of In re
Merz.74 Considering the patentability of purified ultramarine, a preexisting
material used as a blue pigment,75 the C.C.P.A. found that “while appellant
may be entitled to a patent on a method for purifying an ultramarine either
artificial or natural, he is not entitled to a patent on the article which after being
produced has a greater degree of purity than the product produced by former
methods.”76 However, the court also noted that this general rule has an
exception: “The exception is that if the process produces an article of such
purity that it differs not only in degree but in kind it may be patentable.”77
Building on the implication present in Ridgway that a totally pure version of a
preexisting product may sustain a patent, the exception further focused the
relevant “kind” on structural similarity, distancing the C.C.P.A. from the utility
focus of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Hand.
E.

Seventh Circuit’s Strict Utility-Based Purification Doctrine

In 1939, the Seventh Circuit considered Dennis v. Pitner, where an alleged
infringer of a patent over an insecticide challenged the validity of the patent
based on the product of nature doctrine.78 The inventor of the insecticide was
really more of a discoverer of the product, in that the product itself was a mere
extraction from the root of the South American cube plant.79 However, the
court did not shy away from the characterization of the product as a discovery
and its inventor as a discoverer.80 Instead, the Seventh Circuit embraced the
notion that the patentee had discovered a natural product that could be of great
benefit to mankind.81 According to the court, the “discovery of a natural
phenomenon, or of a quality or attribute of a well-known article, which
discovery is of value to mankind, may be entitled to patent protection.”82 The
court found the distinction between the discovery of previously unknown
utility of a known product and the discovery of the utility of a novel
combination of two known products that creates one new product to be
untenable and irrelevant to patentability.83 Instead, it focused on the language
of the patent statute and the intentions of its drafters that its protections be

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
Id. (emphasis added).
106 F.2d 142, 142–43 (7th Cir. 1939).
Id. at 143.
See id. at 144–46.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 144.
See Dennis, 106 F.2d at 144.
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comprehensive.84 The court concluded that “discovery in the field of science of
a new quality or phenomenon of an old product may be . . . the proper subject
of a patent.”85
Dennis represented the high-water mark for a utility-focused analysis of
the purified preexisting products doctrine. The court seemed to ignore all
precedent in its interpretation of the doctrine. Nowhere in its analysis did the
court even consider the structural similarity between the naturally occurring
cube root and the insecticide. If applied as the law of the purified preexisting
products doctrine, Dennis would stand for the proposition that an extraction of
a preexisting product is different in “kind” from the preexisting product so
long as the extraction contains some useful benefit to mankind not inherent in
the preexisting product.
F.

The Patent Act of 1952 and Its Effect on the Purified Preexisting Products
Doctrine

In 1952, Congress passed a bill into law that overhauled the patent system.
For purposes of patentability, §§ 101 and 102 of the Patent Act of 1952
substantially restated what had been the law since 1870.86 Section 103 of the
1952 Act, however, established a new lexicon for the requirement of invention.
Section 103 provides that an application is unpatentable when “the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.”87 Thus the term “nonobvious” came to define or
replace the older statutory term “invention.” Rather than resolving the brewing
circuit split in the purified preexisting products doctrine, the new statutory
language created an opportunity for further dilution and confusion.
In the seminal case of Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., the
Fourth Circuit considered an appeal from a district court decision invalidating
a patent on vitamin B-12 extracted from fermentation materials.88 The product
claims in the patent were narrowly tailored to cover only the vitamins extracted
from the specified fermentates.89 The Fourth Circuit sought to undermine the
product of nature doctrine, noting “[t]here is nothing in the language of the Act
84. Id. at 145–46.
85. Id. at 146.
86. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (1952), with 35 U.S.C. §§ 31–32 (1926). See also Eric
Golas Salbert, Duck, Duck, Bilski: Searching for a Law-Progress Equipoise, 3 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 339, 345 (2010) (“[A]lthough the current Patent Act of 1952 has been
considered the second substantial revision, the provisions concerning patent-eligible subject
matter appear to have undergone only minor changes.” (footnote omitted)).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
88. 253 F.2d 156, 157 (4th Cir. 1958).
89. Id. at 160.
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which precludes the issuance of a patent upon a ‘product of nature’ when it is a
‘new and useful composition of matter’ and there is compliance with the
specified conditions for patentability.”90 According to the court, since
everything is really derived from a product of nature, no original thought
should be excluded from patentability for that reason alone.91 Instead, the court
seemed to find that, on the basis of its omission in the new statutory language,
the product of nature doctrine amounted to illusory fluff, devoid of any
meaning or purpose. Any application of the product of nature doctrine in the
past was really only a misnomer for one of the explicit statutory terms.92
However, the court did acknowledge the existence of the purified
preexisting products jurisprudence, recognizing two ways in which patented
compositions are not “new and useful compositions of matter” within the
meaning of § 101 of the Act:
(1) [T]hat a patent may not be granted upon an old product though it be
derived from a new source by a new and patentable process, and (2) that every
step in the purification of a product is not a patentable advance, except,
perhaps, as to the process, if the new product differs from the old “merely in
93
degree, and not in kind.”

The court considered the doctrine as it was articulated in American WoodPaper, Cochrane, Ridgway, and Merz, agreeing with the holding of each.94
Despite its knowledge and acceptance of the structural interpretation of the
doctrine, the court, citing Kuehmsted, concluded that just because “a new and
useful product is the result of processes of extraction, concentration and
purification of natural materials does not defeat its patentability.”95
Ultimately, the court was persuaded by Kuehmsted’s utility distinction.
However, rather than focus entirely on the therapeutic value of the extracted
vitamin B-12, the court distinguished the patented product as a new “kind” of
product on two utility-based grounds: “therapeutic and commercial worth.”96
According to the court, the inventor took the natural fermentates “from
complete uselessness to great and perfected utility.”97 In its holding, the Fourth
Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit and Judge Hand in a utility-based approach
to distinguishing new products from the prior art, and further broadened the
definition of utility from mere therapeutic value to include commercial value.
90. Id. at 161.
91. See id. at 161–62.
92. See id. at 162 (“To the extent that the ‘product of nature’ defense has validity, as urged
here, it is a contention that the patented compositions are not ‘new and useful compositions of
matter’ within the meaning of § 101 of the Act.”).
93. Merck, 253 F.2d at 162.
94. See id. at 162–63.
95. Id. at 163.
96. Id. at 164.
97. Id.
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In the 1970 case In re Bergstrom,98 the C.C.P.A. relented and adopted a lax
structural-based approach to purified products with the same effect, but a
different form, as the utility-based approach used by the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits. In the case, the C.C.P.A. considered an appeal from a decision of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) that rejected claims for
purified forms of prostaglandins as patentable subject matter on the grounds
that the claims lacked novelty.99 The same prostaglandins claimed in the
applicants’ patent were present and naturally occurring in “human seminal
fluid, human prostrate secretions, and secretions of the vesicular gland of
sheep,”100 but it was only after purification that it became possible “to utilize
their pharmacodynamic effects without undesirable side effects or
reactions.”101
The C.C.P.A. took issue with the Patent Office Board of Appeals’s
position that a claimed pure material is not and cannot be novel with respect to
less pure forms of the same material.102 According to the court, “by definition,
pure materials necessarily differ from less pure or impure materials and, if the
latter are the only ones existing and available as a standard of reference . . .
perforce the ‘pure’ materials are ‘new’ with respect to them.”103 Furthermore,
the court found “whether the claimed pure materials have the same usefulness
or assortment of properties as the impure materials of the prior art, as the board
here found, is a question having no bearing on the factual and legal matter
whether pure materials are new vis-à-vis impure materials within the meaning
of § 101.”104 In so holding, the C.C.P.A. plainly placed the purified preexisting
products doctrine within the statutory novelty requirement and expressly
rejected a utility-based approach to defining a purified product as different in
“kind” from the less pure form of the product. At the same time, the court
distanced itself from the doctrine as it was presented in American Wood-Paper
and Cochrane, finding that a mere extraction from “human seminal fluid,
human prostrate secretions, and secretions of the vesicular gland of sheep” was
different in “kind” from its source material.
In 1991, after the commencement of the human genome project, the first
cases involving isolated and purified DNA patents were being considered by
courts. In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., the defendants, who held
a patent over a human protein, were being sued for use of that protein by the

98.
99.
100.
101.
1397.
102.
103.
104.

427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
Id. at 1395.
Id.
Id. at 1396. “The material obtained was found to lower rabbit blood pressure.” Id. at
See Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1401–02.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1402.
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holder of a patent over the purified and isolated DNA sequence capable of
producing that same protein.105 The defendants offered as their defense to the
infringement suit a claim that the plaintiff’s patent over the purified and
isolated DNA was invalid.106 However, it is not clear from the court’s analysis
whether American Wood-Paper or Cochrane were invoked by the defendants
as grounds for the patent’s invalidity. Though the court did recognize that
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant “invented” the gene or the protein
produced by the gene,107 it found that the discovery of the isolated and purified
DNA sequence, previously unknown, sustained a valid patent.108 So, with little
to no analysis, the Federal Circuit opened the door to a deluge of patent
applications on isolated and purified DNA sequences, and as a direct result, in
1997, the USPTO issued a patent on isolated and purified DNA known as
BRCA1.109
II. MYRIAD LITIGATION
A.

Myriad: Procedural Background

On May 12, 2009, a group of plaintiffs, including physicians, patients, and
various interested medical organizations, represented by the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York against the USPTO, Myriad
Genetics (“Myriad”), and the Directors of the University of Utah Research
Foundation.110 The plaintiffs identified several specific BRCA1 and BRCA2
patent claims they believed constituted patents on natural human genes in
violation of the product of nature doctrine.111 Specifically, the plaintiffs
identified claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 of patent 5,747,282 (“patent ‘282”) and claim 1
of patent 5,837,492 (“patent ‘492”).112
Patent ‘282 “relates to methods and materials used to isolate and detect a
human breast and ovarian cancer predisposing gene (BRCA1).”113 More

105. 927 F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
106. Id. at 1204.
107. Id. at 1206.
108. Id. at 1206, 1219.
109. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 51, at 358–59.
110. Complaint at 1, 30, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) [hereinafter Complaint]. Note the plaintiff also makes First Amendment
arguments to the effect that patenting a sequence of DNA that is innate in every or some person
or persons violates such persons’ freedom of speech. Id. at 19.
111. Id. at 20–21.
112. Id.
113. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, at [57] (filed June 7, 1995).
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specifically, the invention relates to germline, somatic, and gene mutations in
the BRCA1 gene and their use in the diagnosis of predisposition to breast,
ovarian, and other cancers, as well as relating to various therapies for cancers
that have a mutation in the BRCA1 gene.114 Claims 1 and 2 relate to the
isolated DNA coding of the BRCA1 gene’s amino acid and nucleotide
sequences respectively.115 Claims 5 and 6 are dependent claims that relate back
to claims 1 and 2 respectively and essentially require a minimum of fifteen
nucleotides of each amino acid or nucleotide sequence116 because that “number
of nucleotides is usually about the minimal length required for a successful
probe that would hybridize specifically with a BRCA1-encoding sequence.”117
Patent ‘492 “relates to methods and materials used to isolate and detect a
human breast cancer predisposing gene (BRCA2).”118 Like patent ‘282, patent
‘492 specifically relates to germline, somatic, and gene mutations in the
BRCA2 gene and their use in the diagnosis of predisposition to breast, ovarian,
and other cancers, as well as relating to various therapies for cancers that have
a mutation in the BRCA2 gene.119 Claim 1 independently claims ownership of
the invention of “[a]n isolated DNA molecule coding for a BRCA2
polypeptide.”120
The plaintiffs also identified several BRCA1 and BRCA2 claims they
thought failed as claiming nothing more than naturally occurring genetic
mutations. The plaintiffs alleged that Myriad merely observed variants in
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes present in individuals and obtained patents on
those naturally occurring mutations.121 Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged
the validity of claim 1 of patent 5,693,473 (“patent ‘473”), claim 7 of patent
‘282, and claims 6 and 7 of patent ‘492.122
Issued a few months before patent ‘282, patent ‘473 also deals with
“methods and materials used to isolate and detect a human breast and ovarian

114. Id.
115. Id. at col. 153 ll. 55–61.
116. Id. at col. 153 ll. 66–67 to col. 154 ll. 55–56.
117. Id. at col. 20 ll. 38–40.
118. U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, at [57] (filed Apr. 29, 1996).
119. Id.
120. Id. at col. 167 ll. 15–17. It is not clear why the plaintiffs did not follow parallel tracks
when alleging the invalidity of the ‘282 claims relating to natural human genes and the ‘492
claims relating to natural human genes. Claims 1 and 2 of both the ‘282 patent and the ‘492
patent correspond to the same essential claims as they relate to BRCA1 and BRCA2 respectively.
However, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of claims 1 and 2 of ‘282 while challenging only
the validity of claim 1 of patent ‘492 on the same grounds. Likewise, the plaintiffs challenged
claims 5 and 6 of patent ‘282 but did not challenge the virtually identical claim 5 of patent ‘492.
The plaintiffs provide no reason for the patent ‘492 omissions in their complaint. See Complaint,
supra note 110, at 30.
121. Complaint, supra note 110, at 21.
122. Id.
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cancer predisposing gene (BRCA1).”123 However, whereas ‘282 claims
BRCA1 in its pure, non-mutated form, ‘473 is more limited in scope to specific
alterations to the natural BRCA1 sequence. Claim 1 of ‘282 is the broadest
independent claim, relating to all the alterations to the BRCA1 sequence
described in a series of tables found in the detailed description.124 Narrower
independent and dependent claims not challenged by the plaintiffs also claim
subsets of claim 1 that amount to human genes with natural mutations.125
Claims 7 of patent ‘282 and claims 6 and 7 of patent ‘492 also lay out
specific genetic mutations to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes respectively.
Claim 7 of ‘282 identifies and claims three instances of amino acid variance at
specific nucleotide positions.126 In claim 6 of ‘492, Myriad set out an
independent claim to any mutated form of the BRCA2 gene that creates a
susceptibility to cancer, and the dependent claim 7 narrows the scope of claim
6 to a particular mutation identified by a mutated nucleotide sequence set out
in the patent.127
In support of its summary judgment argument that all of the composition
claims at issue do, in fact, fall under the § 101 definition of composition of
matter, Myriad relied on the development of the isolated and purified products
doctrine.128 Myriad contended that the plaintiffs’ argument depended on a
complete demolition of all of the caselaw in the isolated and purified products
doctrine since Parke-Davis and Bergstrom.129 Myriad also made a similar
argument that the plaintiffs simply ignored the clear imposition of the
USPTO’s guidelines that affirmed the patentability of genetic inventions.130
According to Myriad:
The composition-of-matter claims—covering isolated BRCA1/2 nucleic
acids—are patent-eligible because they do not exist in pure form in nature. In

123. U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473, at [57] (filed June 7, 1995).
124. See id. at col. 159 ll. 57–62.
125. Id. at col. 159 ll. 63–67, col. 160 ll. 57–58, col. 162 ll. 1–16.
126. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 col. 154 ll. 57–67 (filed June 7, 1995) (“(a) [A] DNA having
the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1 having T at nucleotide position 4056; (b) a
DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1 having an extra C at nucleotide
position 5385; (c) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 1 having G at
nucleotide position 5443; and, (d) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID
NO:1 having 11 base pairs at nucleotide positions 189–199 deleted.”).
127. U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 col. 167 ll. 30–36 (filed Apr. 29, 1996).
128. See Myriad Defendants’ Memorandum of Law (1) in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment and (2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum of Law].
129. Id. at 3–4.
130. Id. at 4.
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addition, they differ in kind from native (naturally occurring) BRCA1/2 genes.
Specifically, the claimed isolated nucleic acids have new properties and
functions not found in the native genes, resulting in “ample practical
131
differences” from the native genes.

In its brief analysis, it further argued that “isolated DNA molecules are distinct
from any substance found in the human body—indeed, in all of nature.”132
This is because “[i]solated DNA acquires new properties not shared by its
native (naturally occurring) counterpart,” and “[t]hese new properties impart
isolated DNA molecules with new characteristics and new utilities.”133 These
isolated DNA molecules can be used in ways that are not possible for native
DNA; they can be used as a probe “to target and bind to a particular portion of
DNA” or as primers “to bind to (or ‘hybridize’ with) a DNA target.”134
B.

Myriad: Scientific Background

Some discussion of the pertinent science of molecular biology is in order.
For the purposes of this Note, the trial court’s discussion of the subject, which
is largely consistent with the appellate court’s explanations of genetics, will
provide the basis for the overview. The court began its discussion with Gregor
Mendel and his first recognition of the notion of genetic material.135 Though
Mendel recognized the notion of genetics in the nineteenth century, it was not
until 1944 that scientists discovered that the carrier for genetic material was
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”).136 The double-helix structure was identified
by James Watson and Francis Crick, and Crick later proposed three assertions
that make up “the central dogma” of genetic science: “(1) information is
encoded in a segment of DNA, i.e., a gene; (2) transmitted through a molecule
called RNA; and then (3) utilized to direct the creation of a protein, the
building block of the body.”137 The court noted that since the work of Watson
and Crick, “understanding of the DNA contained within our cells has since
grown at an exponential rate and has included the landmark completion of the
first full-length sequence of a human genome, containing 25,000 genes, as a

131. Id.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 128, at 8.
134. Id.
135. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702
F. Supp. 2d 181, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012).
136. Id. at 192–93. The process by which scientists recognized that DNA was the carrier for
genetic material involved transferring DNA extracted from one strain of bacteria to another and
recognizing the attribution of genetic characteristics of the first strain in the second. Id. at 193.
137. Id. at 193.
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result of the work performed by the Human Genome Project from 1990 to
2003.”138
The court then turned its discussion away from the development of modern
genetic science to the current state of the field.139 “DNA is a chemical
molecule composed of repeating chemical units known as ‘nucleotides,’”
which are either adenine (“A”), thymine (“T”), cytosine (“C”), or guanine
(“G”).140 “DNA typically exists as a ‘double helix’ consisting of two
intertwined strands of DNA that are chemically bound to each other.”141 The
double helix structure occurs because of “base pairing,” where A on one side
of the double helix binds to T on the other side of the double helix, and in the
same manner G on one side of the double helix binds to C on the opposing
side.142 Each of these base pairs is known as a nucleotide, and the terms
“genetic sequence,” “nucleotide sequence,” or “DNA sequence” all refer to
linear arrangements of these nucleotides.143 Noticeably distinguishable, a gene
is “composed of several, typically contiguous, segments of DNA.”144 Genes
contain “the information used by the body to produce . . . proteins.”145 They
are further comprised of both exons, the segments of the DNA sequences
necessary for the creation of a protein, and introns, segments of DNA not
required to create a protein.146 “DNA encodes proteins by way of three
nucleotide combinations, termed ‘codons,’ that correspond to one of twenty
amino acids that constitute the building blocks of proteins.”147 The human
body contains roughly 25,000 genes which comprise the human genome,148
and the series of nucleotide sequences within the human genome and the order
of the nucleotides within each sequence are entirely naturally occurring.149

138. Id.
139. See id. According to the court, its characterization of the field “represents the standard
undisputed knowledge of those in the field of molecular biology.” Id.
140. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
141. Id. at 193–94 (footnote omitted). A helix is a shape that essentially takes the form of the
red ribbon on an old-fashioned, white and red barber’s pole. A double helix takes the shape and
orientation of the corresponding white ribbon of a barber’s pole.
142. Id. at 194.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194. The genetic production of proteins is known as
encoding. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Since “there are only twenty different amino acids but 64 possible codons that can be
derived from combinations of the four DNA nucleotides, most amino acids are encoded by more
than one DNA codon.” Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Molecular biologists refer to the normal sequence of a human gene as the
gene’s “wild-type.”150 Variations from the “wild-type” genes are called
mutations, which can take the form of single misplaced nucleotides or
misplaced gene sequences hundreds of nucleotides long.151 Some of these
mutations correlate with known effects on the human body in the form of
particular diseases.152
DNA “is not typically found floating freely in cells of the body, but is
packaged into chromosomes.”153 Chromosomes are made up of chromatin, a
mixture of genomic DNA that is bound to proteins.154 From this chromosomal
environment, DNA can be extracted, and from the extracted DNA, a particular
segment of the DNA, the “purified DNA,” can be excised.155 Purified DNA
and synthesized DNA, the DNA that has been created in a laboratory, can be
used as a “probe,” “a diagnostic tool that a molecular biologist uses to target
and bind to a particular segment of DNA, thus allowing the target DNA
sequence to be detectable using standard laboratory machinery.”156 Likewise,
DNA that has been purified or synthesized may function as a “primer” “to
sequence a target DNA, a process used by molecular biologists to determine
the order of nucleotides in a DNA molecule, or to perform polymerase chain
reaction (‘PCR’) amplification, a process which utilizes target-DNA specific
primers to duplicate the quantity of target DNA exponentially.”157 These
probes or primers bind with corresponding nucleotide sequences in the target
DNA, if such a nucleotide sequence exists therein.158 Because of these
phenomena in molecular biology, the purified BRCA sequences derive their
utility from their ability to bind with the native BRCA sequences should they
exist within the native DNA.159
RNA, like DNA, “is composed of a combination of four different
nucleotides, three of which are the same bases incorporated into DNA.”160
However, instead of T, RNA comprises uracil (“U”) as a fourth nucleotide.161
RNA forms the basic messenger material through which the processes of
“transcription” and “translation” can form the protein that corresponds with the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
Id.
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exons in the DNA.162 During transcription, RNA forms a temporary copy of a
DNA sequence.163 This temporary copy is called a “pre-messenger RNA” or
“pre-mRNA”.164 “In a process known as ‘splicing,’ the introns are physically
cut out of the pre-mRNA by the cell and the remaining RNA segments
containing the exons are rejoined, or ‘ligated,’ together in consecutive order to
form the final ‘messenger RNA,’ or ‘mRNA.’”165 During translation, the
mRNA sequence is used “as a template for the assembly of a protein.”166
Complementary DNA (“cDNA”) “is typically generated by scientists in a
laboratory.”167 It is “generated from mRNA during a process known as
‘reverse transcription,’” and takes the form of the bases corresponding to those
in the mRNA, which is also the same form as the protein coding sequences
encoded by the original DNA (without introns).168 cDNAs do occur in nature
in the form of pseudogenes.169 All cDNA, whether it is synthetically created or
a naturally occurring pseudogene, has distinct differences from native DNA.170
Because the cDNA is formed out of RNA that had already gone through the
transcription process, it lacks the introns present in native DNA and therefore
does not have to go through RNA splicing to produce proteins.171 Furthermore,
cDNA may be unable to produce proteins without regulatory sequences and
162. See id. (“During transcription, a discrete segment of DNA unwinds itself inside the cell
and the bases of the DNA molecule act as ‘clamps’ that hold the bases of the newly forming RNA
molecule in place while the chemical bonds of its sugar-phosphate backbone are formed. Each
nucleotide in the DNA strand corresponds to a nucleotide to be incorporated into the newly
forming RNA molecule: adenine on the DNA molecule binds to and thereby acts as a clamp for
RNA nucleotide uracil, thymine for adenine, guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for
guanine.”(citation omitted)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197–98. “Pre-mRNAs can also undergo a process known as
‘alternative splicing,’ in which different combinations of exons from the same pre-mRNA
molecule are ligated together to yield different final mRNA products.” Id. at 198.
166. Id. at 198 (“In a process that parallels the transcription of DNA, the mRNA bases, along
with other proteins in the cell, serve as clamps to hold the corresponding amino acids in place
while the chemical bonds between the individual amino acids are formed. The three-nucleotide
codons originally found in DNA and copied into mRNA determine which amino acids are
incorporated into the protein and the order in which they are incorporated.” (citation omitted)).
167. Id.
168. See id. (“During reverse transcription, each base of the mRNA serves as a clamp for its
complementary nucleotide to be incorporated into the new cDNA molecule while the chemical
bonds between the nucleotides of the cDNA strand are formed. Much like transcription, uracil on
the mRNA binds to and thereby acts as a clamp for the nucleotide adenine, adenine for thymine,
guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for guanine. The synthesis of cDNA from very long mRNA
molecules, such as BRCA1 and BRCA2, often does not result in a cDNA strand that is as long as
the mRNA chain.” (citations omitted)).
169. Id.
170. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
171. Id. at 198–99.
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may have additional nucleotide sequences not present in the corresponding
native DNA that formed as a result of the additional “‘poly A tail’ sequence
found in mRNA.”172 Likewise, cDNA is also more stable than mRNA and
“requires both transcription and translation to produce protein, rather than
simply translation, as is the case with mRNA.”173 cDNA can be used the same
way as isolated DNA (as a probe or primer), or cDNA can be used to learn
more about a protein.174
C. Myriad I: Southern District of New York Decision
After considering the opposing sides’ arguments, the trial court described
the validity of the composition claims issue as “whether or not claims directed
to isolated DNA containing naturally-occurring sequences fall within the
products of nature exception to § 101.”175 The court identified several cases
that it included in its product of nature discussion that have not yet been
broached in this paper.176 These cases, which include American Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. Brogdex Co.,177 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,178 and
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,179 established the product of nature doctrine
generally.180 Although the court used these cases distinctly from the
purification cases and thereby established the invalidity of the composition
claims,181 it is worth briefly discussing the way in which these cases formed
the structure of the court’s explanation of the product of nature doctrine.
According to the court, American Fruit Growers stood for the proposition that
a product fails to satisfy the § 101 subject matter eligibility requirements
“unless it ‘possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property’ compared
to the naturally-occurring article” from which it is derived.182 To the extent that
the court discussed American Fruit Growers, Funk Brothers, and Chakrabarty
as a separate and distinct basis for concluding that the composition claims were
invalid, they will not be discussed here. Instead, attention will be paid to the
bulk of the court’s analysis involving the purification doctrine.

172. Id. at 199.
173. Id.
174. See id. (“[A] scientist seeking to learn more about a protein of interest may transfer a
cDNA encoding the protein into a recipient cell that does not normally express that protein. If the
cDNA is operatively linked to particular ‘promoter’ sequences that initiate transcription from the
cDNA, the recipient cell will then express the protein of interest.”).
175. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
176. See id. at 222–23.
177. 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
178. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
179. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
180. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 222–23.
181. See id. at 232.
182. Id. at 222 (quoting American Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11).
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In laying out the doctrine, the court looked to American Wood-Paper and
Cochrane.183 Likewise, the court found that General Electric, In re Marden,
and Ex Parte Latimer were pertinent.184 In recounting each of these cases, the
court concluded that earlier courts had all held that the purifications of the
preexisting products discussed therein were not subject matter eligible under §
101 because they violated the product of nature doctrine.185
The court also considered cases proffered by Myriad, including In re
Bergstrom, which the court dismissed for not having been decided by the
Supreme Court,186 and In re Kratz.187 According to the court, both of these
cases “presented issues of novelty and anticipation rather than the question of
patentable subject matter.”188 It found that the Bergstrom court “in effect
treated the rejection as if it had been made under § 102, observing in the
process that ‘[t]he word “new” in § 101 is defined and to be construed in
accordance with the provisions of § 102.’”189 Likewise, the court found that,
although the Kratz court discussed whether the composition was a naturallyoccurring compound, “the court treated the appeal as a question of novelty and
anticipation pursuant to § 102.”190
However, the court gave stronger consideration and spent more effort in its
analysis of Myriad’s use of Parke-Davis. According to the district court, the
“question before the court in Parke-Davis was one of novelty (a modern-day §
102 question), not of patentable subject matter (the § 101 question before this
Court).”191 Likewise, the court found that it was “[o]nly after concluding that
the claimed purified adrenaline was novel over the prior art” that Judge Hand
“offer[ed], as dicta, the statement to which Myriad cites: ‘[b]ut, even if it were
merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that such products
are not patentable.’”192 The court concluded that “the accuracy of this
statement at the time was written [sic] is dubious in light of American WoodPaper (to which Judge Hand did not cite),” and “it is certainly no longer good
law in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases.”193 Likewise, “Judge Hand’s
suggestion that a claimed invention was patentable since it was a ‘new thing
commercially and therapeutically,’” is at odds with subsequent caselaw

183. See id. at 223–24.
184. See id. at 224.
185. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223–24.
186. Id. at 224.
187. Id. at 226–27.
188. Id. at 226.
189. Id.
190. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
191. Id. at 225.
192. Id. (quoting Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)).
193. Id. at 226.
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“establishing that ‘it is improper to consider whether a claimed element or step
in a process is novel or nonobvious, since such considerations are separate
requirements’ when evaluating whether a claim is patent-eligible subject
matter.”194
Finally, the court considered and dismissed Myriad’s arguments premised
on Merck. The court found the holding in Merck to be entirely consistent with
the cases it relied upon in this case.195 Because the purified substance there
“was more than a ‘mere advance in the degree of purity of a known product,”‘
the Southern District concluded that the Merck court must have found that the
product there was markedly different from any product already in existence.196
Accordingly, after considering all of these cases in the lineage of the
purification doctrine, the court concluded that “purification of a product of
nature, without more, cannot transform it into a patentable subject matter”;
instead, “the purified product must possess ‘markedly different characteristics’
in order to satisfy the requirements of § 101.”197
It is worth briefly noting some differences between the court’s
interpretations of the purified preexisting products jurisprudence and the
discussion of those same cases here. The trial court was cautious to portray
Parke-Davis as holding on § 102 novelty, quickly dismissing the therapeutic
and commercial value tests.198 Noting a clear line between § 101 subject matter
eligibility and § 102 novelty issues, the court was able to easily distinguish
these cases from Myriad I. However, as discussed earlier, Parke-Davis is really
best read as standing for the proposition that two products, one preexisting and
the other a purification of the former, are different in “kind” when having
substantially different commercial or therapeutic value.199 The rationale behind
the court’s choice to focus on the delineation between subject matter eligibility
and novelty as opposed to subject matter eligibility and utility presents itself in
its analysis of the composition claims in Myriad I.
At the outset of its application of the purified preexisting products doctrine
to the composition claims, the court criticized Myriad’s argument that focused
solely on the structural differences in the native and isolated DNA.200
Referring to the useful property of DNA as an information carrying
composition, the court noted that “Myriad’s focus on the chemical nature of
DNA, however, fails to acknowledge the unique characteristics of DNA that

194. Id. (quoting Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)).
195. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
200. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
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differentiate it from other chemical compounds.”201 The court found that the
structural differences between native and isolated DNA were unimportant to
determining whether the two substances are markedly different; instead, the
court focused on the “utility associated with DNA in its isolated form” as the
“defining characteristic.”202
The court did, however, acknowledge the structural differences between
Myriad’s composition claims and native DNA, recognizing that native DNA is
diluted with chromosomal proteins not present in the isolated DNA and that
inside native DNA is found introns also nonexistent in the isolated form.203
Likewise, the court conceded the fact that isolated DNA attained certain
functional differences from native DNA, particularly its utility as a probe or
primer or sequencing target.204 However, the court found all of these
differences to be secondary because the purification of native DNA does not
alter its nucleotide sequence.205 Instead, to the court, the marked element
distinguishing the two compositions was their utility as information carriers,
and, since the two compositions carry the same basic chemical information,
Myriad failed to “establish the existence of differences ‘in kind’ between
native and isolated DNA that would establish the subject matter patentability
of what is otherwise a product of nature.”206
D. Myriad II and Myriad III: Federal Circuit’s Decisions
Upon review of the district court decision, a split Federal Circuit opinion
written by Judge Lourie came to a different conclusion.207 Unlike the lower
court, the Federal Circuit characterized the distinction between a product of
nature and an invention of patentable subject matter as turning on “a change in
the claimed composition’s identity compared with what exists in nature.”208
Discussing the facts of the Myriad litigation in light of this standard, the court
noted “[i]t is undisputed that Myriad’s claimed isolated DNAs exist in a
distinctive chemical form—as distinctive chemical molecules—from DNAs in
the human body.”209 According to the court, “BRCA1 and BRCA2 in their
isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in the body;
human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a portion of a native

201. Id.
202. Id. at 229.
203. See id. at 229–30.
204. See id. at 230.
205. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 231–32.
206. Id. at 232.
207. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), 653 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
208. Id. at 1351.
209. Id.
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chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical
identity from that possessed by native DNA.”210
The court next sought to address the distinct structural identity of isolated
DNA in purification terms:
[I]solated DNA is not purified DNA. Purification makes pure what was the
same material, but was previously impure. Although isolated DNA must be
removed from its native cellular and chromosomal environment, it has also
been manipulated chemically so as to produce a molecule that is markedly
211
different from that which exists in the body.

The court went on to explain that “a covalent bond is the defining boundary
between one molecule and another,” and the differences in these chemical
bonds between native and isolated DNA “separate one chemical species from
another.”212 In analysis that should prove helpful to determining the boundaries
of the purification doctrine, the court distinguished between chemical
alteration and physical alteration.213 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
purification doctrine does not necessarily preclude isolated DNA from being
patentable subject matter, and distanced itself from the rationale of the district
court, noting the genes’ “informational content is irrelevant to that fact.”214 In
so doing, the court, although refusing to adopt the purification jurisprudence as
its basis, effectively returned to a strong structural approach to the purification
doctrine. Moreover, the court sought to remove any consideration of utility
from subject matter eligibility analysis and focused strictly on the structural
properties of the claimed composition.
Judge Moore reached the same conclusion but differed slightly from the
majority in her approach. According to Judge Moore, the chemical difference
between native and isolated DNA does not alone make the native DNA so
markedly different to place the isolated DNA within the realm of subject
matter eligibility.215 Instead, Judge Moore looked to Funk Brothers to support
the assertion that “an invention which ‘serve[s] the ends nature originally
provided’ is likely unpatentable subject matter, but an invention that is an
‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature may be
patentable.”216 Accordingly, Judge Moore engaged in the analytical effort of

210. Id. at 1352.
211. Id.
212. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1352–53.
213. Id. at 1354.
214. Id. at 1353.
215. Id. at 1359 (Moore, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 1359–60 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131
(1948)).
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ferreting out a “new utility which makes the molecules markedly different
from nature.”217
Judge Moore, unlike the district court, found sufficient new utility to place
the isolated DNA within eligible subject matter, noting the “ability to use
isolated DNA molecules as the basis for diagnostic genetic testing is clearly an
‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature.”218 However,
on this point, the concurring opinion distinguished between claims over two
classes of isolated DNA: the first, short strands used as primers, and the
second, longer strands not used as primers.219 Because the shorter strands of
native DNA could easily be used as a primer and the same nucleotide sequence
in native form could not, Judge Moore found that claims covering those shorter
strands could easily be reconciled with the utility requirement she had
articulated earlier.220 “Longer strands of isolated DNA, in particular isolated
strands which include most or all of the entire gene, are a much closer case.”221
Actually, Judge Moore was unable to identify any purely utility-based benefits
of longer strands of isolated DNA sufficient to show an “enlargement of the
range of . . . utility,” and, instead, she relied on more pragmatic reasons to
uphold the claims’ validity.222 Judge Moore pointed to the USPTO’s history of
allowing claims on purified natural products and isolated DNA, and she
concluded that, as a matter of judicial restraint, the court ought not to overturn
such precedent and create uncertainty in scientific communities.223
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Bryson advocated for a subject matter
eligibility standard that considers both structural differences and differences in
utility.224 While acknowledging the presence of certain chemical differences
between native and isolated DNA, Bryson refused to concede that those
minimal differences are sufficient to make the isolated DNA a materially
different composition.225 According to Bryson, the “only material change made
to those genes from their natural state is the change that is necessarily
incidental to the extraction of the genes from the environment in which they
are found in nature.”226 Though Bryson recognized that the two forms have

217. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1365 (Moore, J., concurring).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1364–65.
220. Id. at 1365.
221. Id. at 1366.
222. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1366–67 (Moore, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 1367.
224. See id. at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“In sum, the test employed by the Supreme
Court in Chakrabarty requires us to focus on two things: (1) the similarity in structure between
what is claimed and what is found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between what is
claimed and what is found in nature.”).
225. Id. at 1375.
226. Id.
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chemically different structures due to separation of previous covalent bonds, he
concluded “there is no magic to a chemical bond that requires us to recognize a
new product when a chemical bond is created or broken.”227 In fact, Judge
Bryson implied that only a matter of degree distinguishes separating a
molecule from a larger chemical structure and separating a leaf from a tree.228
Since the chemical distinction alone does not make the isolated DNA
subject matter eligible, Judge Bryson then turned his attention to the second
prong of his proffered test for subject matter eligibility: utility. Like the district
court, Bryson focused on DNA’s informational properties as the primary point
of utility.229 According to Bryson, the isolated DNA, when compared to the
native DNA, “retains the character and function of the product as found in
nature” and “does not result in the creation of a human invention.”230
Supporting his utility-focused analysis with cases such as Parke-Davis, the
judge concluded that “[w]hat is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic
coding material, and that material is the same, structurally and functionally, in
both the native gene and the isolated form of the gene.”231
However, shortly after the Federal Circuit decided Myriad II on subject
matter eligibility grounds, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that changed the
analytical framework of 35 U.S.C. § 101, at least with respect to method
claims.232 In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
the Supreme Court found that even though an application of a law of nature to
a known process may be patentable, “to transform an unpatentable law of
nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than
simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’”233 If the
application of a law of nature merely substitutes a newly discovered law of
nature into a well-known combination of steps in a process that applies a

227. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1375 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 1377.
229. See id. at 1377–78.
230. Id. at 1377.
231. Id. at 1378.
232. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Breyer found claims directed at a method of assessing a proper drug
dosage to be ineligible under § 101. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). The claims at issue recited
only:
(1) an “administering” step—instructing a doctor to administer the drug to his patient—
(2) a “determining” step—telling the doctor to measure the resulting metabolite levels in
the patient’s blood—and (3) a “wherein” step—describing the metabolite concentrations
above which there is a likelihood of harmful side-effects and below which it is likely that
the drug dosage is ineffective, and informing the doctor that metabolite concentrations
above or below these thresholds “indicate a need” to decrease or increase (respectively)
the drug dosage.
Id. at 1290–91.
233. Id. at 1293–94.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

796

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:769

similar or related law of nature, such application is normally unpatentable.234 It
is important to note that in Prometheus, the Court was concerning itself with
method claims, which are subject to considerations that are quite distinct from
composition claims.235 Despite the obvious differences between composition
claims and method claims, in response to its decision in Prometheus, the
Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad II and
remanded it for Federal Circuit review in light of Prometheus.236
In response to the Prometheus decision, the USPTO issued a white paper
that directed examiners on how to interpret the Supreme Court’s rather openended instruction.237 As a first question, in order to determine the applicability
of the Prometheus analysis, the USPTO requires its examiners to consider
whether “the claimed invention [is] directed to a process, defined as an act, or
a series of acts or steps.”238 Thus, in the USPTO’s estimation, the Supreme
Court was uniquely concerned with process claims and was interested only in
bolstering the threshold for whether a process claim is a “practical application”
of a law of nature. At a fundamental level, this means that, according to the
USPTO, Prometheus should have no bearing on the composition claims in the
Myriad litigation.
On remand to the Federal Circuit, the same three-judge panel heard
arguments as to the applicability of Prometheus.239 Applying Prometheus to
the claims at issue, the court found that the method claims were invalid in view
of the Supreme Court’s decision.240 Ultimately, however, the three judges were
not swayed by the Supreme Court on the composition claims. Judge Lourie
found that “[Prometheus] does not control the question of patent-eligibility of
[composition] claims.”241 Further distancing himself from the Court’s

234. See id. at 1297–98.
235. Accordingly, the Court also was concerned with policy arguments that are applicable to
laws of nature and less apt with respect to products of nature. “The Court has repeatedly
emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the
future use of laws of nature.” Id. at 1301. This is because the Court recognized that laws of nature
are “the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” and as such deserve special protection.
Id. These policies apply with unique force to laws of nature because a monopoly over a law of
nature can inhibit innovation and scholasticism in ways that tend to be beyond the reach of mere
products of nature.
236. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794, 1794 (2012).
237. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2012 INTERIM PROCEDURE FOR SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY ANALYSIS OF PROCESS CLAIMS INVOLVING LAWS OF NATURE, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/2012_interim_guidance.pdf.
238. Id. at 2.
239. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad III), 689
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
240. Id. at 1333.
241. Id. at 1325.
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Prometheus decision, Judge Lourie continued: “While [Prometheus] and
earlier decisions concerning method claim patentability provide valuable
insights and illuminate broad, foundational principles, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers set out the primary framework for
deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of matter, including isolated
DNA molecules.”242 Since Prometheus did not apply, Judge Lourie was free to
apply the same rationale that he had in his earlier decision.243
Judge Moore noted that, following the direction of the Court in
Prometheus, the question of eligibility of the composition claims could be
decided on the basis of two principles: “(1) laws of nature/manifestations of
nature are not patentable; (2) a composition of matter with ‘markedly different
characteristics’ from that found in nature with the potential for significant
utility is directed to patentable subject matter.”244 Finding that Prometheus did
not control the outcome of the case, in a truncated opinion, Judge Moore found
that the composition claims were eligible subject matter on the same grounds
as in her vacated opinion.245 She also once again expressed her opinion that, if
given a blank canvas, she would possibly come to a different conclusion.246
But in her view, the scientific community’s reliance upon longstanding
precedent allowing patents on isolated DNA compelled her to exercise judicial
restraint.247
Judge Bryson concurred in part and dissented in part. Like the other
members of the panel, Judge Bryson did not construe Prometheus as deciding
this case.248 He did however believe that some of the underlying principles
upon which Prometheus was decided could be applied here.249 “Just as a patent
involving a law of nature must have an ‘inventive concept’ that does
‘significantly more than simply describe . . . natural relations,’ a patent
involving a product of nature should have an inventive concept that involves
more than merely incidental changes to the naturally occurring product.”250
Relying on Prometheus for the principle that there ought to be a meaningful
threshold to subject matter eligibility, Judge Bryson again found that claims
directed to isolated DNA are not patent-eligible subject matter because they
fail to recite a useful difference from naturally occurring DNA
compositions.251

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 1326.
See id. at 1326–33.
Myriad III, 689 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring).
See id. at 1339–48.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1344–45.
Id. at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Myriad III, 689 F.3d at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1355 (citation omitted).
See id.
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III. PROPOSING A BRIGHT-LINE STANDARD FOR THE PURIFICATION DOCTRINE
Although neither the District Court nor the Federal Circuit was inclined to
analyze the patentability of the isolated DNA sequences using solely purified
preexisting products jurisprudence, the doctrine, if properly articulated, could
provide clear, helpful guidance in this context as well as in other emerging
micro-science contexts. At this point, it is worth reviewing the status of the
doctrine prior to the Federal Circuit’s first consideration of the validity of
patents claiming purified and isolated DNA sequences.
In American Wood-Paper and Cochrane, the Supreme Court set out the
rule that a mere extraction of a preexisting product is not patentable if the
extract does not amount to a new “kind” of product.252 While Cochrane
seemed to shift the American Wood-Paper definition of “kind” to a purely
structural one, the Seventh Circuit, later joined by Judge Hand and the Fourth
Circuit, defined two products as being different in “kind” when they have
different therapeutic and commercial values.253 In Bergstrom, the C.C.P.A.
seemed to adopt a more structural approach, but one where only slight
structural differences are required to show that two products are different in
kind.254 So, along one axis, discord developed in defining when two products
are the same in “kind,” with the disagreement centered on the precise
definitions or factors relevant to a product’s “kind.” However, augmenting the
confusion with respect to the doctrine, on an entirely separate axis,
disagreement seems to have developed in regard to the statutory basis for the
purified preexisting products doctrine. Traditionally, the doctrine was rooted in
and a natural extension of the product of nature doctrine, but the Fourth Circuit
expressly denied the existence of such a doctrine, making it an issue of
novelty.255 Likewise, by focusing so intently on utility as the distinguishing
characteristic of a product’s “kind,” the Seventh Circuit, whether intentionally
or by implication, analyzed purified preexisting products under the statutory
term “utility.”256 This multidimensional conflict within the doctrine has created
an untenable system that is of little value in providing guidance to courts or
other patent authorities in determining the eligibility of claims over extractions
or purifications of known products.
A.

Determining the Statutory Basis for the Purification Doctrine

Before addressing the ultimate issue of defining the term “kind” for
purposes of the purified preexisting products doctrine, the statutory basis for
the doctrine should be determined. Confusion as to which statutory element the
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra notes 52–62, 88–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
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purified preexisting products doctrine applies can reasonably be attributed to
confusion surrounding the product of nature doctrine generally. Since nothing
in the statute explicitly requires that each statutory category be considered
independently, occasionally courts, in response to the natural analytical overlap
between the categories, blur what should be the bright lines between them.
Having never appeared in the statutory lexicon, the product of nature doctrine
is a judicial creation,257 making it all the more susceptible to being analyzed
outside of its proper context.
Assuming the premise that each statutory element is separate and distinct,
the rule for purified preexisting products ought to be analyzed as a discrete
issue of subject matter eligibility, novelty, nonobviousness, or utility. As
discussed earlier, courts have lacked consistency with respect to their
analytical approach to the doctrine, explicitly assigning it to statutory novelty
and implicitly conflating it with statutory utility.258 This inconsistency has
predictably led to confusion in the application of the doctrine. To develop an
approach to purified products that produces consistent, predictable, and fair
results, the statutory basis for the doctrine must be resolved.
Ultimately based on the following considerations, the appropriate statutory
basis is § 101 subject matter eligibility. The source of the purified preexisting
products doctrine is the product of nature doctrine, and, though it applies to
purifications of products of nature and man-made preexisting products,259 it is
best classified as an offshoot thereof. The product of nature doctrine is
generally understood as a judicial creation to be analyzed as a matter of subject
matter eligibility.260 It limits the scope of patent-eligible materials by excluding
those products that exist in nature.261 American Wood-Paper and Cochrane,
the only Supreme Court discussion of the purification doctrine, simply expand
the scope of excluded products from precise products of nature to include mere
extractions of products of nature. Thus, Supreme Court authority is clear on the
source of the purification doctrine, and, without a fundamental shift in patent
law, wherein the requirement of subject matter eligibility is done away with, or
alternatively the destruction of the product of nature doctrine as advocated by
the Fourth Circuit in Merck,262 the statutory authority for the purified
preexisting products doctrine should remain the § 101 subject matter eligibility
requirement.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See Parasidis, supra note 1, at 333–34.
See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
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Defining a “Kind” of Composition

Assuming the premises that the purification doctrine properly resides
within the § 101 subject matter eligibility statutory requirement and that each
statutory element should be considered independently, the commercial and
therapeutic value tests advocated for by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits lead to
an improper conflation of statutory elements. Whether a composition or other
patented invention has the proper utility is an issue that ought to be analyzed
exclusively as a matter of the utility element of patentability. Since the statute
expressly provides that a patentable invention must have utility,263 considering
the utility of the extraction or purification of a composition in determining
whether it is a mere purification results in a conflation of the statutory
elements. Commercial and therapeutic values are merely nominally different
expressions of utility, and, since the purification doctrine is analytically
distinct from the statutory utility analysis, any discussion of utility within the
purification doctrine is analytically improper. Even though the Supreme Court
in American Wood-Paper left some ambiguity as to whether a purification is
different from its source composition in “kind” because of its structural
differences or functional differences,264 recognition of the statutory source of
the purification doctrine compels the conclusion that the Court intended the
doctrine to distinguish between patentable and unpatentable purifications on
the basis of their structural similarity to their source materials.
Since the purified preexisting products doctrine, as articulated in American
Wood-Paper and Cochrane, was established as an offshoot of the product of
nature doctrine, a component part of § 101 subject matter eligibility and not §
101 utility,265 it ought to be considered as a distinct requirement from utility.
This conclusion is also supported by the general principles of claim drafting.
The USPTO has recognized that inventions should be described in the claims
structurally rather than functionally and that, particularly in biotechnology
patent applications, a mere functional description of an invention will not
support a valid patent.266 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
expressly adopts a requirement that biotechnology claims be described
structurally.267 In so doing, the USPTO has adopted essentially a structural
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
264. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
266. See MPEP, supra note 18, § 2163 (“The claimed invention as a whole may not be
adequately described where an invention is described solely in terms of a method of its making
coupled with its function and there is no described or art-recognized correlation or relationship
between the structure of the invention and its function. A biomolecule sequence described only by
a functional characteristic, without any known or disclosed correlation between that function and
the structure of the sequence, normally is not a sufficient identifying characteristic for written
description purposes, even when accompanied by a method of obtaining the claimed sequence.”).
267. Id.
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definition for “kinds” of compositions. This USPTO imperative, in
combination with the statutory basis for the purified preexisting products
doctrine, strongly supports a categorical definition for “kinds” of compositions
as determined by said compositions’ structure.
However, this conclusion still leaves the doctrine no more easily applied
than subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cochrane. Some tangible,
structural standard must be articulated to distinguish between mere
purifications and new products that are different in “kind” from any preceding
compositions. To prevent arbitrary application, an appropriate standard should
be based on readily identifiable physical indicia and should signify a genuinely
meaningful difference between the new and old compositions. Recall that in
American Wood-Paper, the Supreme Court considered the distinction between
a pure mixture and an impure mixture insignificant for the purposes of gauging
subject matter eligibility.268 By extension then, removing an independent
substance from a mixture269 and creating a pure form of that substance does not
create a composition that is different in “kind” from the previously existing
composition. In both cases, the preexisting compositions contained the claimed
composition in a discrete chemical form, so as a practical matter there is not a
meaningful difference between the discrete material as it existed within the
mixture and as it exists in pure form.
Moving from weaker to stronger connections between materials,
intermolecular forces between molecules provide the next logical break point
worth considering. Generally, intermolecular forces fall into one of six
categories: dipole-dipole, ion-dipole, dipole-induced dipole, ion-induced
dipole, London dispersion forces, and hydrogen bonding.270 These forces are
extremely weak relative to intramolecular forces,271 and the point of their
bonding marks the separation point between two discrete molecules. The
connection created thereby is generally insufficient to bond two or more
portions of the same molecule.272 However, hydrogen bonding is different in
that regard. Molecules, including molecules of common compositions like

268. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
269. From a thermochemical perspective, as compared with chemical reactions that result in
new chemical compounds, mixture and separation causes a near negligible enthalpy change. See
PETER ATKINS & JULIO DE PAULA, ATKINS’ PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 51 (8th ed. 2006). Thus, it is
changes in chemical identity as measured by new or broken chemical bonds that account for the
enthalpy change of chemical reactions.
270. See Todor K. Gounev, Lecture 3 Notes, CHEMISTRY 211/212: GENERAL CHEMISTRY,
http://g.web.umkc.edu/gounevt/Weblec212Silb/L3(12.3-12.4).pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
271. See THANDI BUTHELEZI ET AL., CHEMISTRY: MATTER AND CHANGE 411 (2008).
272. See Jim Clark, Intermolecular Bonding—van der Waals Forces, UNDERSTANDING
CHEMISTRY, http://www.chemguide.co.uk/atoms/bonding/vdw.html (last updated Sept. 2012).
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water, are formed by way of hydrogen bonding.273 Intermolecular forces, then,
provide little categorical guidance because they do not form a bond that holds
together one or more parts of a discrete composition.
Finally, consider briefly intramolecular bonding as the relevant break point
for a new composition in “kind.” Intramolecular forces occur in one of three
forms: ionic bonding, covalent bonding, and metallic bonding.274 The extent to
which atoms and ions are bound together into one discrete compound is
generally controlled by these forces.275 If at any point one of these bonds is
broken, the derivative pieces are two or more different chemical entities from
their source material.276 It is this consequence of intramolecular forces that
make them an appropriate starting point for establishing a categorical
distinction between materials that are different in “kind.”
However, the categorical definition cannot rest on the presence or absence
of ionic, covalent, and metallic bonding alone because, as discussed above,
hydrogen bonding can form the basis of distinct chemical compounds in the
same way that these intramolecular forces do.277 Furthermore, unfortunately
for the sake of the simplicity of the patent system, discrete materials are not
always defined by molecular boundaries. Materials such as salts and crystals
are not technically molecules,278 but instead are series of two- or threedimensional patterns of chemical structure.279 However, these complexities of
material science coupled with the most basic of human perception can form a
workable definition. Generally, whether considering molecules, ions, ionic
compounds, salts, crystals, or any other material, a minimal chemical form that
defines the material is ascertainable. That is to say that if a container of a
discrete chemical compound is processed, the processing mechanisms can chip
away material until a point is reached where what remains is that very same
material, but if any more were to be removed, it would result in a new material
of a different chemical structure. It is that chemical structure that ought to
define a material’s “kind.”280
273. See Walt Volland, Intermolecular Forces Dipole-Dipole, London Forces, Hydrogen
Bonding Versus Covalent Bonds, http://www.800mainstreet.com/08/0008-0012-interforce.html
(last updated Nov. 3, 2011).
274. BUTHELEZI ET AL., supra note 271, at 411.
275. Id.
276. Atkins distinguishes between two separate forms of discrete chemical entities, covalently
bonded molecules and ionically bonded formula units. ATKINS & DE PAULA, supra note 269, at
362. For the purposes of this Note, discrete compositions or discrete chemical substances refer to
either molecules or formula units.
277. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
278. These are what Atkins refers to as formula units. See ATKINS & DE PAULA, supra note
269, at 960.
279. See BUTHELEZI ET AL., supra note 271, at 212–13.
280. In terms of Atkins’ definitions, a composition’s “kind” is the chemical structure that
makes up a discrete molecule or formula unit. See supra note 276.
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There are, of course, limitations to this categorical definition. In fact, Judge
Bryson, who wrote the dissenting opinions in Myriad II and III, found that
assigning value to the presence or absence of chemical bonding was
arbitrary.281 As shown above, however, the chemical bond that creates and
maintains distinct chemical structure is anything but arbitrary. It is the very
thing that defines discrete materials and ought to provide definitively whether
compositions are different in “kind” from previously existing compositions.
However, In re Marden found that purification of a natural chemical element
that only existed in nature outside of its pure elemental form would not sustain
a composition patent.282 This poses a more problematic hurdle to the effective
administration of this proposed definition, but ultimately this issue is better
addressed as an exception to the purification doctrine. As a sub-issue of the
product of nature doctrine, courts ought to continue to find that fundamental
elements that exist in nature in non-elemental form are not patentable subject
matter. Even though the element, in its pure form, is a distinct chemical
structure from preexisting materials, chemical elements are too foundational to
all scientific notions of materials and too prevalent throughout nature to be
considered patentable subject matter.
CONCLUSION: APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED BRIGHT-LINE RULE TO MYRIAD
Accordingly, a mere extraction of a preexisting product that is not different
from the preexisting product in “kind,” where “kind” is defined as a new
discrete chemical structure, is not patentable subject matter. This discrete
chemical structure can be ascertained by chipping away at a material until a
point is reached where what remains is that very same material, but if any more
were to be removed, it would result in a new material of a different chemical
structure. By adopting this definitional approach to the purification doctrine
and providing an articulable standard for subject matter eligibility, courts could
help create certainty in the patent system without upsetting the analyses of the
other three elements of patentability. This is but one step in creating a more
workable patent system. Ultimately, a standard for each separate element of
patentability should be clearly defined, creating a system where each statutory
element has a discrete meaning and distinct purpose in the larger patentability
system. By adopting such an approach, the courts would create predictability
and consistency that would promote the progress of science and the useful arts.

281. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad III), 689
F.3d 1303, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
282. See In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1931). On its surface, Marden seems to
undermine the definition of “kind” previously adopted because a pure elemental form of an atom
is a discrete chemical entity from the molecule or formula unit from which it came.
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Applying this standard to the Myriad facts makes quick work of the subject
matter eligibility issue. Since even the trial court’s decision and Judge
Bryson’s dissent acknowledged that each of the claimed compositions was for
a new chemical structure,283 the claims should not fail on subject matter
eligibility grounds because what is claimed is a composition that is different in
“kind” from the natural composition from which it is based. Because isolated
DNA is a distinct material from native DNA, it ought to at least pass the
threshold question of subject matter eligibility. This is not to conclude on the
whole issue of patentability, and, to an even greater extent, this conclusion is
not intended to provide a policy judgment on the efficacy of gene patents.
Instead, the purpose of this analysis is to draw attention to the confused state of
patentability by highlighting one judicial creation within one statutory element
and pointing out the confusion created therefrom. By adopting a more
categorical approach to the statutory elements and attempting to define the
judicial creations of each, courts can bring much needed clarity to the patent
system and generally promote the progress of science.
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